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ABSTRACT
Grounded in the notion of speed of adjustment this study investigates the adjustment rate of 
corporate cash holdings and financial constraints in Chinese firms. For this purpose data 
of 867 A-listed Chinese firms over a 14 years period (2001–2014) is analysed. The study 
applies Arellano and Bond (GMM2) and Blundell and Bond (GMM1) dynamic panel data 
model to investigate asymmetric speed of adjustment. We report considerable evidence 
about asymmetric adjustment of corporate cash holdings, i.e., downward adjustment rate 
is significantly higher than upward adjustment rate. This higher downward adjustment rate 
holds even after controlling for financial constraints. Moreover financial constraints also 
play an important role in dynamic cash adjustment. Financially unconstrained firms are 
found to adjust faster to their target cash holdings as compared to financially constrained 
firms. The high speed of adjustment for above target cash level firms holds even after 
controlling for financial constraints.
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INTRODUCTION
Based on the work of Modigliani and Miller (1958), it can be argued that in 
frictionless market firms are at ease in securing funds and there is no need to 
accumulate cash for future liquidity concerns. However in practical world capital 
markets are not frictionless and firms are not always able to raise as much funds 
as they need. Firms have to search for optimal external sources. This scarcity of 
funds and search for funds sources are very likely to affect firms' cash management 
practices.
The general purpose of hoarding cash is to support operating activities and 
ensure that these activities run smoothly, and to ensure that firm is able to invest in 
times of shocks or scarcity of funds. However holding cash have some associated 
costs. Most prominent costs include the lower return on most liquid assets and 
agency costs associated with agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. 
Although Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (1999) comprehensively 
examined the determinants of cash holdings; however, the motive to hoard cash 
is a highly debatable topic of corporate finance. The research studies conducted 
in the strands of pecking order theory (Myers & Majluf, 1984) propose that high 
cash reserves enable the firms to invest in high Net Present Value (NPV) projects 
especially when external financing sources are more costly (Almeida, Campello, 
& Weisbach, 2004; Denis & Sibilkov, 2009). This indicates firm's cash reserves 
are determined by investing, financing and payout patterns. On the other hand 
agency theory (Jensen, 1986) advocates a weakness in discipline for managers and 
CEOs in time of high cash holdings and misappropriation of high cash reserves in 
value decreasing projects (Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, & Servaes, 2003; Faulkender & 
Wang, 2006; Dittmar & Mahrt-Smith, 2007). This indicates neither the pecking 
order nor the agency theory explain adjustment of cash holdings. Actually it is in 
the perimeter of trade off theory to explain adjustment of corporate cash holdings 
to an optimal level based on a tradeoff of benefits and costs associated with 
certain level of cash. Based on these costs and benefits an optimal level of cash 
is determined and when cash deviates from this level firm tries to adjust its cash 
towards that optimal level. There are considerable research studies which provide 
empirical support for the presence of optimal (target) level of cash holdings 
for firms. These studies include Kim, Mauer, and Sherman (1998), Opler et al. 
(1999), Ozkan and Ozkan (2004), Garcia-Teruel and Martinez-Solano (2008), and 
Rehman and Wang (2015). Despite extensive research very little evidence exists 
on the asymmetric adjustment (from above and below the target level of cash) of 
corporate cash holdings. There are numerous studies on investment (Ono, 2003; 
Pratap, 2003) and capital structure literature that have studied adjustment from 
optimal level asymmetrically (Byoun, 2008; Kim, Shin, & Dang, 2009). More 
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recently Hugonnier, Malamud and Morellec (2015) reports that target level of cash 
holdings exist such that firms use payout policies to reduce cash to maintain a 
reduced or optimal level of cash and utilise retained earnings and other investing 
strategies to increase level of cash to an optimal level of cash.
Moreover financial constraints have different implications for firms which 
are financially constrained. Thus cash policies of constrained firms become more 
attractive from research point of view. Almeida et al. (2004) advocates a high 
sensitivity of cash policies of finically constrained firms to cash flow volatility 
and other firm's specific determinants of cash holdings as compared to financially 
unconstrained firms.
Thus in order to investigate upward and downward adjustment of corporate 
cash holdings and across financial constraints in Chinese firms, this study uses an 
extensive set of data of 867 A-listed Chinese firms over a 14 years period (2001–
2014). We employ two dynamic panel data models for the purpose of robustness 
i.e., Blundell and Bond (2000) system dynamic model (GMM1 from here on) and 
Arellano and Bond (1991) linear dynamic panel data model (GMM2 from here 
on). We find that speed of adjustment for cash holdings is higher for firms having 
cash holdings above the target level of cash holdings. We report adjustment rates 
of 0.621 (GMM1) and 0.46 (GMM2) for below target firms. While for above 
target firms GMM1 reports an adjustment rate of 0.74 and GMM2 reports an 
adjustment speed of 0.69. This higher speed of adjustment of above target firms 
holds even after incorporating financial constraints into our analysis. Moreover 
we report considerable evidence that speed of adjustment is higher for financially 
unconstrained firms than financially constrained firms.
REVIEW OF PRIOR STUDIES AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
The presence of market frictions and market imperfection make corporate cash 
holdings relevant. There is a huge debate on corporate cash holdings from the 
motives of hoarding cash. Many prior researchers attributed precautionary motives 
to be underlying factors of cash management. Keynes (1936) described transaction 
motive as to be the hallmark in cash management such that cash reserves will 
save transaction costs involved with capital rising and will present sale of assets 
for payment purposes. Moreover for firms having their purpose of shareholders 
wealth maximisation will consider the cost and benefits associated with holding 
cash. In this regard Opler et al. (1999) examined factors that can act as the gradient 
for optimal cash policy where the marginal costs and benefits of cash holdings are 
equal. Firms having access to capital markets and which can easily raise funds 
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have less liquid assets in their reserves. Similarly, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) 
argue that firms having assets that can easily be sold off,  have the tendency to hold 
less cash. Firms with greater investment opportunities will try to hold more cash, 
so that in time of optimal opportunities they are not faced with cash shortage thus 
avoiding the slipping away of a better investment opportunity.  Holding financial 
instruments can also reduce level of firm's cash holdings. Firms can easily use 
financial instruments for hedging and raising the required capital. Moreover firms 
with shorter cash conversion cycles are expected to hold less cash.
Harford, Klasa and Maxwell (2014) argue that cash holdings are 
also affected by firm's refinancing risk. Their arguments are based upon the 
precautionary motive of firm's cash holding. They report evidence that firms 
increase cash holdings in order to alleviate refinancing risk and saves cash from 
the free cash flows. Their findings are further supported by Acharya, Davydenko 
and Strebulaev (2013). Acharya et al. (2013) utilise the precautionary motive to 
explain the direct relationship between cash and credit spreads. They found that 
on average riskier firms accumulates higher cash. The findings in the strand of 
precautionary motive of cash accumulation are further supported by Bates, Kahle 
and Stulz (2009). While analysing the US firms they reported that there exists 
a dramatic increase in firms' cash holdings in the US firms during the period of 
1980–2006 due to precautionary motives of firms. This behaviour of increased 
cash holdings was prevalent in firms which do not pay dividends, for firms which 
recently issued an Initial Public Offering (IPO) and for firms characterised with 
higher idiosyncratic risk.
In the context of financial constraints there exists some evidence to explain 
firms' cash holding behaviour. According to Almeida et al. (2004) firms with 
higher investment needs and inhabiting in a highly imperfect market tend to hoard 
more cash to efficiently manage their liquidity because there investment ability 
is constrained by market frictions. They reported that cash holdings are affected 
by financial constraints such that financially constrained firms are more sensitive 
to cash flow volatility pattern than unconstrained firms. Financially constrained 
firms hold more cash in time of higher cash flows while unconstrained firms are 
not much affected by cash flow volatility. Denis and Sibilkov (2009) argue that for 
constrained firms there are higher cash levels which can be associated with higher 
level of investment and higher investment results in higher value for constrained 
firms as compared to unconstrained firms. After a survey of 1050 chief financing 
officers (CFOs) in 2008, Campello, Graham and Harvey (2010) argued that in time 
of lesser liquidity and cash crunch, firms tend to cut their investment in technology, 
research and development (R&D), and even downsize. They further reported that 
in time of crises firms cut a sizable portion of their cash savings and dividend 
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payout. Majority of CFOs argued that financial constraints hit their pursuit of 
profitable investment projects. Furthermore constrained firms may sell off their 
assets to generate funds especially in times of liquidity crises.
H1: The adjustment rate of cash holding is higher for financially 
unconstrained firms than financially constrained firms.
In the context of firm's asymmetric adjustment, it can be argued intuitively, 
that when a firm cash level is above its optimal level, it can distribute dividends, 
make repayments on loans etc. to bring the cash level down to the optimal level. On 
the other hand if a firm cash level is below optimal level, it can slash its investment, 
reduce or stop payout or even raise external funds to attain the optimal cash level. 
Thus in time of uncertainty it will be easy to bring down cash reserve to optimal 
level when cash level of the firm is above target level than to increase cash level 
when it is below target level.
Based on the above arguments we develop following hypotheses.
H2: Downward adjustment rate is higher than upward adjustment rate 
of corporate cash holdings.
H3: Higher downward adjustment holds even after controlling for 
financial constraints.
Determinants of Cash Holdings
We follow Opler et al. (1999) for various determinants of cash holdings incorporated 
in our regression models. Following section provides a debate on the relationship 
between cash holdings and various determinants of cash holdings.
Growth opportunities
Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) argue that due to the intangibility associated with cash 
flows of future projects, the relevance of these cash flows is wiped out. This 
argument is further supported by D'Mello, Krishnaswami and Larkin (2008). 
According to them valuing firms with higher future cash flows will be very difficult 
since valuation depends upon the realisation of these cash flows. According to the 
arguments of pecking order theory firms with higher investment opportunities will 
need more cash for investment. On the other hand trade off theory advocates the 
need of higher cash to invest in future projects in times of financial distress. This 
avoidance of cash shortfall comes under the transaction motive of holding cash 
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(Opler et al., 1999). The motive to avoid financial distress is supported by research 
in the strand of precautionary motive of holding cash (Bates et al., 2009).
On the other hand many studies reported a negative relationship between 
cash holdings and growth opportunities. These studies include Ferreira and Vilela 
(2004), Jani, Hoesli and Bender (2004) and Bates et al. (2009). They base their 
arguments on agency theory and argue that firms may even invest in projects 
with negative NPV due to agency conflicts especially in firms with entrenched 
management and low growth opportunities.
The above arguments show an unclear relationship between cash holdings 
and growth opportunities. This study follows Hill, Kelly and Highfield (2010) in 
measuring growth opportunities. Growth opportunities are measured through the 
ratio of market value of assets and book value of assets.
Firm size
Titman and Wessels (1988) argue that smaller firms tend to be more financially 
distressed because economies of scale can be achieved through corporate cash 
management. Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) argue that information asymmetry is 
associated with smaller firms. Due to this information asymmetry it is difficult 
for smaller firms to raise external funds (Ferreira & Vilela, 2004). One important 
consideration in this regard is the better credit position of bigger sized firms and 
availability of credit lines to them (Opler et al., 1999). These two factors makes 
bigger sized firms to raise external funds at ease and hence reap the benefits of 
economics of bigger size (D'Mello et al., 2008). This negative relationship is 
based on trade off theory and corresponds to transaction motive of cash holdings 
(Bates et al., 2009). However according to Opler et al. (1999), Ferreira and 
Vilela (2004), and Jani, Hoesli and Bender (2004), higher profits are associated 
with bigger firms and hence these firms accumulate more cash after controlling 
for their investment. Thus on the basis of their arguments size positively affects 
cash holdings. Furthermore agency theory advocates that bigger sized firms have 
higher dispersion of ownership and thus managers have discretion in their financial 
decision making. This shows that agency theory predicts a positive relationship.
The above arguments show an unclear relationship between firm size 
and cash holdings. This study takes the natural logarithm of firm's total assets to 
measure firm's size.
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Cash flow
According to Kim et al. (1998) and Ferreira and Vilela (2004) cash flow increases 
liquidity and decreases the need to hold extra cash. Trade off theory advocates a 
negative relationship between cash holdings and cash flow. However, Ferreira and 
Vilela (2004) argue that firms keep most of the cash from cash flows and thus pecking 
order theory predicts a positive relationship. Deloof (2003) argue that cash is the 
most liquid assets and firms that utilize liquid assets to finance their investments will 
thus retain most of the cash flows as cash holdings. This relationship is supported 
by Garcia-Teruel and Martinez-Solano (2008). They reported higher cash levels 
for firms having larger cash flows. These findings correspond to financing motives 
of cash holdings. Deloof (2003) supports precautionary motives of holding cash to 
finance operation in time of lower liquidity.
Thus on the basis of these contrasting views of two theories we expect 
cash flow to influence corporate cash holdings either positively or negatively. We 
follow Hill, Kelly and Highfield (2010) to measure cash flows. We calculate cash 
flows by subtracting interest expense, tax and any common dividend from EBIT 
(Earnings before Interest and Taxes). We add depreciation and amortisation to 
EBIT and divide it by total assets for scaling purpose.
Leverage
Leverage increases financial distress and there are chances of firms' bankruptcy 
with increased leverage. Firms with higher level of leverage are expected to hold 
more cash in order to cope with bankruptcy risk (Deloof, 2003). This corresponds 
to precautionary motives of holding excess cash. This is also in line with trade off 
theory and hence leverage is expected to have a direct relationship with corporate 
cash holdings. On the other hand Ferreira and Vilela (2004) and D'Mello et al. 
(2008) argue that firms' leverage corresponds to firms' ability to raise more debt 
and thus less cash is held by firms with high leverage. Thus an inverse relationship 
between cash holdings and leverage is expected. Research in the strands of pecking 
order theory advocates that raising debt is preferred after all the retained earnings 
are used up. Thus in a situation when firms' investment needs exceeds retained 
earnings firms use cash to finance their investments and thus cash level falls. In 
the context of agency theory Jensen (1986) advocates that more cash is held by 
an entrenched management when investment opportunities are lower and cash is 
not distributed as dividend to shareholders. During periods of poor investment 
opportunities the management may use cash to finance even projects having 
negative NPV due to managers' vested interest and such projects are immune to be 
scrutinised by many participants of financial markets. This shows that leverage is 
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expected to influence corporate cash holdings both positively as well as negatively. 
We measure leverage as the ratio to total debt to total assets.
Networking capital
Networking capital is a liquidity source. Ferreira and Vilela (2004) on the basis 
of trade off theory argue that firms having higher networking capital tend to hold 
less cash. Being a liquid source, networking capital can also be liquidated when 
needed to finance investments. This is in line with the transaction motive of 
holding cash. Hence trade off theory predicts an inverse relationship between cash 
holdings and networking capital. However in the context of cash conversion cycle 
(CCC) this relationship will be negative. Jani et al. (2004) argue that firms with 
shorter CCC holds less cash because shorter CCC frees up cash which can then 
be used to finance investment. Thus a positive relationship between cash holdings 
and networking capital (NWC) is expected. To measure NWC this study subtracts 
accounts payable from the sum of accounts receivables and inventories. This value 
is then divided by total assets for scaling purpose.
Capital expenditure
According to Opler et al. (1999) firms having higher needs of capital expenditure 
tend to hold more cash. Thus on the basis of trade off theory firms having higher 
investment needs of capital expenditure hold more cash, so that they are in a better 
position to finance their capital expenditure. This positive relationship is reported 
by Bates et al. (2009), who argue that capital expenditure is a proxy of distress 
and hence capital expenditure positively affects corporate cash holdings. There are 
two important costs that can be related to capital expenditure. One is transaction 
cost while other constitutes opportunity cost. According to Jani et al. (2004) these 
two costs become more important for firms having less cash or assets with higher 
liquidity. Thus firms with greater capital expenditure hold more cash. However, in 
the context of pecking order theory, Opler et al. (1999) advocate that firms will use 
cash in order to finance capital expenditure and hence such firms report lower cash 
levels. Their findings are supported by Jani et al. (2004). Thus pecking order theory 
predicts an inverse relationship between cash holdings and capital expenditure.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
We use an extensive set of date over a 14 years period (2001–2014). We select 867 
A-listed non-financial firms listed on Chinese stock market. Data is collected from 
RESSET, WIND and CSMAR (China Stock Market and Accounting Research) 
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Chinese databases. Firms codes ranges from C00002 to C601991. A total of 12063 
firm level observations over a period from 2001 to 2014 are included in analysis. 
Data is further divided into two subsamples i.e., firms with cash holdings above 
target level and firms with cash holdings below the target level. The categorization 
of firms into above and below target firms is borrowed from capital structure 
literature (Hovakimian, Opler, & Titman, 2001; Drobetz & Wanzenried, 2006).
Measurement of Financial Constraints 
Altman's Z score
In the first step of our analysis we identify financially flexible firms using the 
Altman's Z-scores index model as suggested by Bancel and Mitoo (2011). It 
consists of the variables that capture some unique effects of the crisis. The model 
is based on leverage, liquidity and profitability ratios as follows:
Table 1
Distribution of firms across industries
Industry 
code Industry name
No. of 
firms
A01 Farming 22
A02 Forestry 6
A03 Animal husbandry 13
A04 Fishery 11
A05 Service industry for farming, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery 2
B06 Coal mining and washing 26
B07 Exploitation of petroleum and natural gas 7
B08 Extracting and dressing of ferrous metal mines 6
B09 Extracting and dressing of non-ferrous metal ores 22
B11 Mining support activities 15
C13 Agro-food processing industry 42
C14 Foodstuff manufacturing industry 32
C15 Wine, soft drinks and refined tea industry 36
C17 Textile industry 69
C18 Leather, fur, down and related products and footwear 16
C20 Timber processing, wood, bamboo, cane, palm fibre and straw products 7
C21 Cabinetmaking industry 9
(continued on next page) 
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Industry 
code Industry name
No. of 
firms
C22 Papermaking and paper product industry 28
C23 Printing and reproduction of recorded media 7
C24 Culture, education, engineering beauty, sports and entertainment  
goods industry
14
C25 Petroleum refining, coking and nuclear fuel 21
C26 Chemical feedstock and chemical manufacturing industry 203
C27 Medicine manufacturing industry 179
C28 Chemical fiber manufacturing industry 25
C29 Rubber and plastic products industry 49
 Total 867
Altman's Z-score = 1.2X1 + 1.4X2 + 3.3X3 +0.6X4 + 0.999X5
Where:
X1 = Cash ratio minus Trade payables ratio; this is the sum of cash and cash 
equivalents minus the trade payables divided by the total assets to measure 
the liquidity of the firm. 
X2 = Retained earnings/total assets; the retained earnings represent net earnings 
not paid out as dividends, but retained by the company to be reinvested in 
its core business or to pay debt. 
X3 = earnings before interest and taxes/total assets; this is a ratio that measures 
a company's earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) against its total net 
assets. 
X4 = book value of equity/book value of total liabilities; this is a financial ratio 
indicating the relative proportion of shareholders' equity and debt used to 
finance a company's assets. 
X5 = sales/total assets; this ratio measures the ability of the firm to generate 
revenues using its assets. The higher the ratio of sales to total assets, the 
more efficiently the company is run and the better company leadership is 
at managing assets.
The Altman Z-score provides zones of discrimination for interpretation; 
however we divide the score into three quartiles. The highest quartile corresponds 
to firms that are financially unconstrained while the lowest quartile corresponds to 
firms with financial constraints.
Table 1: (continued)
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SA index
Hadlock and Pierce (2010) created SA index to measure financial constraints 
and argued that exogenous firm's factors are useful in measuring firm's financial 
constraints. Their SA index is based on size and age of firm. Firms with low 
constraints have high SA score and vice versa. Size can be measured through the 
natural logarithm of firm's total assets or sales. Age is calculated since the firm's 
listing date. We use size measure based on assets as well as sales to calculate SA 
index.
SA1 = –0.737(Assets) + 0.043(Assets)2 + –0.040(Firm's Age)
SA2 = –0.737(Sales) + 0.043(Sales)2 + –0.040(Firm's Age)
After calculating SA1 and SA2 we divide the values into three quartiles. 
Firms belonging to quartile three are the financially unconstrained firms while 
those firms which belong to quartile 1 are categorised as financially constrained 
firms.
Statistical Model and Estimation Strategy
Since the objective of this study is to investigate the dynamic adjustment of cash 
towards the optimal target we develop our model from the literature on capital 
structure adjustment (Getzmann, Lang, & Spremann, 2014).
CASH  = α01 + βXit + μit (1)
Where 
α01 corresponds to the constant term. CASH  is the target cash for firm i at time t.  
Xit is a vector term to represent the firm i independent variables at time t.
μit is the error term for a firm i at time t.
Ideally a firm should operate at optimal level of cash holdings. However, 
the adjustment costs and the associated tradeoff may delay adjustment to an 
optimal level of cash holdings. Moreover optimal target level of cash depends on 
number of exogenous and endogenous factors. These factors changes over time 
and so does the speed to achieve a target level of cash holdings. Hence firms try to 
partially adjust to an optimal cash level through a partial adjustment model.
CASHi,t – CASHi,t–1 = δ(CASH  – CASHi,t–1) (2)
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Equation 2 can be rewritten as
CASHit = (1– δ)CASHi,t–1 + CASH  (3)
CASHit is the actual cash holdings of a firm i at time t. δ is the adjustment parameter 
and its value ranges between 0 and 1. If δ =1; it means firm has achieved full 
adjustment of cash holdings within one accounting period. The speed of adjustment 
depends upon costs associated with adjustment which itself depends upon different 
determinants of cash holdings.
Combining Equations 1 and 3 we get the following equation.
CASHit = α0i + (1– δ)CASHi,t–1 + δβXit + μt (4)
In Equation 4, δ is the partial adjustment parameter, 1- is the adjustment 
rate. Xit is the vector form of firm specific factors (cash holdings' determinants). 
We incorporate financial constraints in Equation 4 to get the following Equation 5.
CASHit = α0i + (1– δ)CASHi,t–1 + δβXit (financialconstraint) + μt (5)
In order to test our hypothesis we estimate Equations 4 and 5 through 
Blundell and Bond and Arellano and Bond dynamic panel data estimation methods.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Table 2 corresponds to descriptive statistics. The statistics are for overall firms, for 
firms with cash level above the optimal level and for firms having their cash level 
below the optimal cash levels. Optimal cash level is determined by subtracting 
fitted value of OLS regression from actual cash values. For firms with cash above 
target cash levels, the subtraction value is positive and for below target firms this 
value is negative. Table 2 shows that mean value of cash is much higher for above 
target firms then below target firms. 
Similarly mean values of leverage and cash flows for above target firms 
are much higher, suggesting that these firms hold large cash in order to cope with 
any financial distress. Tobin's Q is also higher for above target firms then below 
target firms, which again suggest that to finance higher growth opportunities, firms 
try to hold more cash.
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Table 2
Descritive statistics
Variable
Full sample Below target Above target
Obs Mean STD Obs Mean STD Obs Mean STD
CASH 12063 0.133 0.112 7048 0.068 0.040 5015 0.224 0.118
LEV 12063 0.815 16.144 7048 0.535 0.751 5015 1.209 25.018
NWC 12063 -0.105 8.477 7048 0.009 0.262 5015 -0.265 13.142
CAPEX 12063 0.248 0.194 7048 0.247 0.205 5015 0.250 0.176
SIZE 12063 21.644 1.332 7048 21.697 1.294 5015 21.568 1.379
TOBINQ 12063 2.001 4.516 7048 1.917 4.550 5015 2.133 4.459
CFLOW 12063 0.095 1.126 7048 0.088 0.202 5015 0.104 1.730
Notes: Obs = Observations; STD = Standard Deviation
Table 3 represents correlations between variables. The last column 
represents values for variance inflation factor. Table 3 indicates that correlation 
values are within limits and there is no serious issue of correlation between 
independent variables. 
Table 3
Correlation matrix
 CASH SIZE CAPEX NWC LEV TOBINQ CFLOW VIF
CASH 1
SIZE -0.06 1 1.16
CAPEX -0.17 0.12 1 1.09
NWC 0.29 0.10 -0.21 1 2.48
LEV -0.07 -0.09 0.04 -0.70 1 3.72
TOBINQ 0.09 -0.27 -0.10 -0.15 0.54 1 2.6
CFLOW 0.08 -0.02 -0.03 0.14 -0.09 0.41 1 1.49
Notes: CASH is the ratio of firm's cash to total assets. SIZE indicates firm's size and measured by taking natural 
log of firm's total assets. CAPEX is total capital expenditure to total assets. NWC is the ratio of networking capital 
to total assets. LEV is total leverage and it is the ratio of total debt to total assets. TOBINQ is ratio of market value 
of firm total assets to book value of total assets. CFLOW is cash flow calculated by subtracting interest payments, 
dividend and taxes from EBIT. VIF is the variance inflation factor.
Values for VIF (Variance inflation factor) are well in accepted range (below 
10). These two facts indicate the absence of multicolinearity between independent 
variables.
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Regression Analysis
Equations 4 and 5 are estimated using two methods of dynamic panel data 
estimation. One of the methods is Blundell and Bond Dynamic Panel System 
Estimation (GMM1), while the other method is Arellano and Bond dynamic panel 
data model (GMM2). Table 4 corresponds to panel data estimation of overall firms. 
The first three columns' results correspond to GMM1 while last three columns 
correspond to results of GMM2.
Table 4
Dynamic panel data regression results for overall firms
 GMM1 GMM2
Adj Rate(λ) 0.617 0.627
CASH(L1) 0.383*** (20.14) 0.373*** (8.52)
LEV 0.045*** (6.06) 0.054* (1.53)
SIZE -0.001 (-0.29) -0.002 (-0.37)
CAPEX 0.078*** (9.36) 0.079*** (6.13)
NWC 0.151*** (9.87) 0.162** (2.93)
TOBINQ -0.001* (-1.58) -0.001 (-0.51)
CFLOW 0.009*** (3.37) 0.013 (1.38)
_cons 0.040 (0.79) -0.011 (-0.14)
 Number of groups 866 866
Number of instruments 85 85
Arellano-Bond test 0.1644 0.1647
Notes: ***, **,* correspond to statistical significance at 99%, 95% and 90% respectively. t test values are given 
in parenthesis. GMM1 is Blundell and Bond estimation. GMM2 is Arellano and Bond estimation. CASH (L1) 
is lagged cash variable. CASH is the ratio of firm's cash to total assets. SIZE indicates firm's size and measured 
by taking natural log of firm's total assets. CAPEX is total capital expenditure to total assets. NWC is the ratio of 
networking capital to total assets. LEV is total leverage and it is the ratio of total debt to total assets. TOBINQ 
is ratio of market value of firm total assets to book value of total assets. CFLOW is cash flow calculated by 
subtracting interest payments, dividend and taxes from EBIT.  
Table 5 shows results for firms with cash holdings below and above target 
level of cash holdings. Above and below target of cash holdings are calculated 
by estimating the fitted value using OLS. These fitted values are subtracted from 
actual values. For firms having cash holdings above optimal level the resulting 
value of subtraction is positive and for firms having cash holdings below target 
level of cash holding a negative value is found. Table 5 incorporates results for 
both GMM1 and GMM2. 
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Tables 6 and 7 show results for firms with financial constraints. Table 6 
shows results for GMM1, while Table 7 shows results for GMM2. In order to 
incorporate financial constraints as controlling factor we do further analysis by 
combining the firms asymmetry (above and below target firms) and financial 
constraints. Tables 8 and 9 correspond to the combine analysis of constraints and 
symmetric adjustment.
Adjustment Rate for Overall Firms
Table 4 shows regression results for over all firms. Table 4 reports a positive 
and statistically significant coefficient for lagged cash (CASHL1). Coefficient 
for GMM1 is 0.383, while for GMM2 it is 0.627. This shows that Chinese firms 
follow a target level of cash holdings in line with trade off theory. Table 4 indicates 
an adjustment rate of 0.617 and 0.637 for GMM1 and GMM2 respectively. This 
is an evidence of robustness of our results. The coefficients for lagged values of 
cash are not only positive but also statistically significant. This shows that Chinese 
firms follow a partial adjustment policy towards an optimal cash position. This 
corresponds to trade off theory. These results are consistent with Rehman and 
Wang (2015) who empirically proved that Chinese firms adjust their cash holdings 
to a target level. Partial adjustment also indicates that Chinese firms follow a target 
level of cash holding. The overall model estimated by both GMM1 and GMM2 
methods are statistically significant. Sragan test value for GMM1 and GMM2 is 
not given because models are estimated with robust standard errors. Number of 
groups for both estimations is greater than number of instruments. For GMM1 
and GMM2 number of groups is 866 and number of instruments are 85 each. 
Furthermore Arellano Bond autocorrelation test (2nd order) value for GMM1 is 
0.1644 and it is statistically insignificant. The same test reports a value of 0.1647 
for GMM2. Both these values are statistically insignificant which indicates the 
absence of 2nd order autocorrelation.
Determinants of Cash Holdings
Along with adjustment rate Table 4 also indicates the relationship of cash holdings 
with its determinants. Coefficient for leverage (LEV) is positive for both GMM1 
and GMM2; however for GMM2 it is statistically insignificant. This is in line 
with empirical research in the strand of trade off theory. Highly levered firms tend 
to accumulate more cash to prevent bankruptcy chances and to reduce financial 
distress (Deloof, 2003). This accumulation of cash for prevention of bankruptcy is 
in accordance with precautionary motives of holding cash. Size shows a negative 
and statistically insignificant relationship. This may be due to the fact that bigger 
firms enjoy reputation and such firms are also at ease to raise external funds in time 
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of need. Thus bigger firms will hold less cash. Both the models show a positive 
and significant coefficient for CAPEX (0.078 and 0.079). Thus firms with higher 
capital expenditure hold more cash (Opler et al., 1999). This is in accordance 
with trade off theory. Our findings are also supported by Bates et al. (2009). Firm 
liquidity or networking capital (NWC) shows positive and significant relationship 
in both models. This corresponds to Jani et al. (2004). They argue that firm cash 
holdings may increase because of the shorter cash conversion cycle of firm. For 
growth opportunities (Tobin's Q) both models result in negative and statistically 
insignificant coefficients. For cash flow (CFLOW) GMM1 results in a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient. This is in accordance with the arguments of 
Ferreira and Vilela (2004) that most of the cash flow is reserved as cash and it acts 
as readily available source of liquidity (Deloof, 2003). 
Adjustment Rate for Above and Below Target Level
Table 5 represents regression results for firms with cash level above and below 
optimal level of cash holdings. First three columns of Table 5 shows result for 
GMM1, while last three columns correspond to the results of GMM2.  For below 
target level firms GMM1 shows a statistically significant adjustment coefficient 
equal to 0.379. While for above target firms GMM1 reports a statistically significant 
coefficient of 0.25. Thus adjustment rate is 0.621(1-0.379) and 0.75(0.25) for below 
and above target firms respectively. GMM2 reports adjustment coefficients of 0.539 
and 0.31 for below and above target firms respectively. Thus adjustment rates are 
0.461 (1-0.539) and 0.69 (1-0.31) for below and above target firms respectively. 
Hence regression results of Table 5 shows that adjustment rates of downward 
adjustment is higher than adjustment rates for upward adjustment. Thus there is 
considerable evidence in support of our hypothesis that downward adjustment rate 
is higher than upward adjustment of cash holdings. Numbers of groups are greater 
than number of instruments for GMM1 and GMM2.
Adjustment Rate of Cash Holdings across Financial Constraints
Tables 6 and 7 represent GMM regression results across financial constraints. Table 
6 corresponds to GMM1 estimation while GMM2 estimation is given in Table 7. 
We used three measures of Financial Constraints. First two columns of Tables 6 
and 7 correspond to Altman Z's Score measure of financial constraints. Middle 
two columns represents results for SA1 (assets based measure) and remaining 
two columns shows results for SA2 (Sales based measure). For all three measures 
of financial constraints and for both of our models adjustment coefficients are 
positive and statistically significant (Tables 6 and 7). Thus there is considerable 
evidence Chinese firms follows a target level of cash holdings both in financially 
constrained and unconstrained situation. 
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Table 5
GMM regression results for above and below target firms
Variables
GMM1 GMM2
Below Above Below Above
Adj Rate(λ) 0.621 0.75 0.461 0.69
CASH(L1) 0.379*** 0.25*** 0.53*** 0.31***
(21.13) (10.21) (11.59) (5.1)
LEV 0.060*** 0.19*** 0.055*** 0.19**
(12.61) (9.27) (4.27) (3.06)
SIZE -0.022** 0.06*** -0.017** 0.07***
(-6.5) (11.44) (-2.37) (6.34)
TANG -0.12*** -0.05** -0.13*** -0.06**
(-13.39) (-3.14) (7.31) (-2.19)
LIQ 0.20*** 0.28*** 0.21*** 0.27***
(13.58) (11.75) (4.91) (4.77)
TOBINQ -0.01*** 0.04*** -0.05** 0.00*
(-9.91) (3.76) (-3.41) (1.93)
CFLOW -0.02*** -0.04** -0.2** -0.03*
(18.1) (-4.02) (7.95) (-1.67)
_cons -0.45** -1.28** -0.33** -1.38**
 Number of groups 834 790 827 768
Number of instruments 97 97 85 85
Arellano-Bond test 0.888 0.1864 0.147 0.830
Notes: ***, **, and * correspond to statistical significance at 99%, 95% and 90% significant level respectively. 
t test values are given in parenthesis. GMM1 is Blundell and Bond estimation. GMM2 is Arellano and Bond 
estimation. CASH (L1) is lagged cash variable. CASH is the ratio of firm's cash to total assets. SIZE indicates 
firm's size and measured by taking natural log of firm's total assets. CAPEX is total capital expenditure to total 
assets. NWC is the ratio of networking capital to total assets. LEV is total leverage and it is the ratio of total debt 
to total assets. TOBINQ is ratio of market value of firm total assets to book value of total assets. CFLOW is cash 
flow calculated by subtracting interest payments, dividend and taxes from EBIT. 
For Altman's Z score the adjustment coefficient is 0.237 and 0.222 (Table 6 
GMM1) for constrained and unconstrained firms respectively. Thus based on 
GMM1 for Altman's Z score measure, adjustment rate for corporate cash holding is 
0.763 (1-0.237) and 0.778(1-0.224) for financially constrained and unconstrained 
firms respectively.
Similarly for SA1 measure of financial constraints, adjustment rates are 
0.644 and 0.743 for financially constrained and unconstrained firms respectively 
(Table 6). Moreover for SA2 (sales based) measure of financial constraints, 
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adjustment rate of corporate cash holdings is 0.568 and 0.69 for constrained and 
unconstrained firms respectively. Thus there is considerable evidence to accept our 
second hypothesis that adjustment rate for cash holdings is higher in financially 
unconstrained firms than financially constrained firms.
Table 6
Regression results for constrained and unconstrained firms (GMM1)
Variables
Z score SA1 SA2
Constrained Unconstrained Constrained Unconstrained Constrained Unconstrained
Adj Speed(λ) 0.76 0.77 0.64 0.74 0.568 0.690
CASH(L1) 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.36*** 0.26*** 0.43*** 0.31***
(4.5) (4.7) (6.7) (7.3) (8.7) (7.8)
LEV 0.014 0.21** 0.02* 0.16*** 0.03** 0.11***
(1.39) (5.99) (1.73) (7) (2.97) (4.62)
SIZE 0.027*** 0.001 0.012 0.01** 0.01* 0.003
(3.67) (0.14) (1.23) (2.27) (1.76) (0.67)
TANG 0.026* 0.067** 0.07*** 0.04** 0.06** 0.06***
(1.81) (2.11) (4.09) (2.98) (2.59) (4.04)
LIQ 0.059*** 0.37*** 0.061 0.22*** 0.08*** 0.22***
(3.93) (7.85) (1.71) (12.3) (3.41) (11.25)
TOBINQ 0.001 0.002 -0.00 0.002 -0.03** 0.004
(-0.3) (0.9) (-0.6) (1.1) (-2.1) (1.5)
CFLOW -0.03*** 0.006* 0.011 0.02** -0.02* -0.011
(-5.3) (1.67) (3.20) (2.64) (-1.6) (-0.42)
_cons -0.53 -0.05 -0.20 -0.30 -0.35 -0.082
 Number of 
groups
696 718 549 579 537 572
Number of 
instruments
85 85 97 97 97 97
Arellano-Bond 
test
0.239 0.282 0.476 0.682 0.125 0.666
Notes: ***, **, and * correspond to statistical significance at 99%, 95% and 90% significant level respectively. t-test values are 
given in parenthesis. GMM1 is Blundell and Bond estimation. GMM2 is Arellano and Bond estimation. Z score is Altman's Z 
score. SA1 is assets' measure of financial constraints. SA2 is sales' measure of financial constraints. CASH (L1) is lagged cash 
variable. CASH is the ratio of firm's cash to total assets. SIZE indicates firm's size and measured by taking natural log of firm's 
total assets. CAPEX is total capital expenditure to total assets. NWC is the ratio of networking capital to total assets. LEV is total 
leverage and it is the ratio of total debt to total assets. TOBINQ is ratio of market value of firm total assets to book value of total 
assets. CFLOW is cash flow calculated by subtracting interest payments, dividend and taxes from EBIT.  
For the purpose of robustness we also checked adjustment rate using 
GMM2 estimation (Table 7). Adjustment rates of corporate cash holdings for 
Altman's Z score are 0.76 and 0.80 for financially constrained and unconstrained 
firms respectively. Similarly for SA1 financial constraints adjustment rates are 
0.61 and 0.78 for financially constrained and unconstrained firms respectively. 
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SA2 measure of financial constraints report adjustment rates of 0.55 and 0.75 for 
financially constrained and unconstrained firms. All the models estimations are 
statistically significant because for all models in Table 7 report more number of 
groups than instruments and all the Arellano Bond tests are insignificant showing 
an absence of 2nd order multicolinearity. Thus there exists enough evidence that 
adjustment rate of cash holdings is higher for financially unconstrained firms than 
financially constrained firms.
Table 7
Regression results for constrained and unconstrained firms (GMM2)
Variables
Z score SA1 SA2
Constrained Unconstrained Constrained Unconstrained Constrained Unconstrained
Adj Speed(λ) 0.76 0.80 0.61 0.78 0.55 0.75
CASH(L1) 0.24*** 
(4.50)
0.20***
 (4.73)
0.39***
 (5.90)
0.22*** 
(5.54)
0.45***
 (6.91)
0.25*** 
(5.83)
LEV 0.01
(1.39)
0.21***
(5.99)
0.02
(1.42)
0.16***
(7.88)
0.03**
(2.83)
0.11***
(5.96)
SIZE 0.03***
(3.67)
0.00
 (0.14)
0.02
(1.55)
0.01**
 (2.25)
0.03**
 (2.17)
0.00
 (0.71)
TANG 0.03* 
(1.81)
0.07** 
(2.11)
0.07***
(3.54)
0.05**
 (3.37)
0.07**
 (2.69)
0.06***
 (4.31)
LIQ 0.06***
 (3.93)
0.37***
(7.85)
0.05
(1.43)
0.22***
(12.13)
0.07**
(3.39)
0.22***
(11.93)
TOBINQ 0.00
(-0.26)
0.00
(0.86)
0.00
(0.35)
0.00
(0.88)
0.00**
(-2.12)
0.00
(1.63)
CFLOW -0.04*** 
(-5.38)
0.01*
(1.67)
-0.01** 
(2.55)
0.03**
(3.11)
-0.02
(-1.56)
0.00
(-0.18)
_cons -0.53 -0.06 -0.29 -0.28 -0.50** -0.08
Number of 
groups
696 718 522 578 491 571
Number of 
instruments
85 85 85 85 85 85
Arellano-Bond 
test
0.2389 0.2821 0.4375 0.9132 0.119 0.9599
Notes: ***, **, and * correspond to statistical significance at 99%, 95% and 90% significant level respectively. t test values are 
given in parenthesis. GMM1 is Blundell and Bond estimation. GMM2 is Arellano and Bond estimation. Z score is Altman's Z 
score. SA1 is assets' measure of financial constraints. SA2 is sales' measure of financial constraints. CASH (L1) is lagged cash 
variable. CASH is the ratio of firm's cash to total assets. SIZE indicates firm's size and measured by taking natural log of firm's 
total assets. CAPEX is total capital expenditure to total assets. NWC is the ratio of networking capital to total assets. LEV is total 
leverage and it is the ratio of total debt to total assets. TOBINQ is ratio of market value of firm total assets to book value of total 
assets. CFLOW is cash flow calculated by subtracting interest payments, dividend and taxes from EBIT.
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Downward and Upward Adjustment Rates across Financial Constraints
Tables 8 and 9 show regression results for asymmetric (upward and downward) 
cash adjustment to an optimal level across firms' financial constraints. Table 
8 represents results for GMM1 while Table 9 shows results for GMM2. First 4 
columns of Tables 8 and 9 corresponds to firm level observations above the target 
level of cash holdings while remaining four columns corresponds to below target 
level of cash holdings. Panel A, B and C of Tables 8 and 9 represent the financial 
constraints measure i.e, Altman's Z score, SA1 and SA2 respectively.
Table 8
Regression results for asymmetric speed and constraints (GMM1)
Above Below
Constrained Unconstrained Constrained Unconstrained
Panel A: Z score
Adj Speed (λ) 0.88 0.76 0.69 0.75
Cash (L1) 0.12*
(1.68)
0.24***
(5.22)
0.31***
(7.39)
0.25***
(5.58)
Number of groups 442.00 542.00 617.00 599.00
Number of instruments 97.00 97.00 97.00 97.00
Arellano-Bond test 0.94 0.27 0.33 0.03
Panel B: SA1
Adj Speed (λ) 0.74 0.79 0.66 0.69
Cash (L1) 0.26*** 0.21*** 0.34*** 0.31***
(4.45) (3.95) (6.31) (6.54)
Number of groups 399.00 428.00 417.00 507.00
Number of instruments 97.00 97.00 97.00 97.00
Arellano-Bond test 0.64 0.72 0.54 0.07
Panel C: SA2
Adj Speed (λ) 0.81 0.80 0.55 0.69
Cash (L1) 0.19*** 0.20*** 0.45*** 0.31***
(3.23) (4.42) (9.32) (7.10)
Number of groups 398.00 421.00 475.00 480.00
Number of instruments 97.00 97.00 97.00 97.00
Arellano-Bond test 0.25 0.9941 0.40 0.26
Notes: ***, **, and * corresponds to statistical significance at 99%, 95% and 90% significant level respectively. 
t statistics are given in parenthesis. GMM1 is Blundell and Bond estimation. GMM2 is Arellano and Bond 
estimation. Z score is Altman's Z score. SA1 is assets' measure of financial constraints. SA2 is sales' measure of 
financial constraints. CASH (L1) is lagged cash variable. CASH is the ratio of firm's cash to total assets.
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Table 9 
Regression results for asymmetric speed and constraints (GMM2)
 
Above Below
Constrained Unconstrained Constrained Unconstrained
Panel A: ZSCORE
Adj Speed (λ) 0.881 0.80 0.55 0.56
Cash (L1) 0.119* 0.20** 0.45*** 0.44***
(1.540) (3.17) (8.19) (6.76)
Number of groups 418.000 500.00 608.00 584.00
Number of instruments 85.000 85.00 85.00 85.00
Arellano-Bond test 0.780 0.32 0.23 0.06
Panel B: SA1
Adj Speed (λ) 0.753 0.83 0.48 0.57
Cash (L1) 0.247* 0.17** 0.52*** 0.43***
(2.730) (2.79) (9.84) (7.28)
Number of groups 357.000 423.00 459.00 504.00
Number of instruments 85.000 85.00 85.00 85.00
Arellano-Bond test 0.749 0.72 0.34 0.12
Panel C: SA2
Adj Speed (λ) 0.852 0.86 0.43 0.60
Cash (L1) 0.148* 0.14** 0.57*** 0.40***
(1.71) (2.64) (8.23) (7.20)
Number of groups 334.000 416.00 523.00 479.00
Number of instruments 85.000 85.00 85.00 85.00
Arellano-Bond test 0.478 0.8899 0.7518 0.21
Notes: ***, **, and * corresponds to statistical significance at 99%, 95% and 90% significant level respectively. 
t statistics are given in parenthesis. GMM1 is Blundell and Bond estimation. GMM2 is Arellano and Bond 
estimation. Z score is Altman's Z score. SA1 is assets' measure of financial constraints. SA2 is sales' measure of 
financial constraints. CASH (L1) is lagged cash variable. CASH is the ratio of firm's cash to total assets.  
For Altman's Z score the above target firms report downward adjustment 
rates of 0.88 and 0.76 for constrained and unconstrained respectively, while 
for below target firms adjustment rates are 0.69 and 0.75 for constrained and 
unconstrained firms respectively (Table 8, GMM1). Similarly according to GMM2 
(table 9) adjustment rates for above target firms are 0.88 and 0.80 for financially 
constrained and unconstrained firms respectively. For below target firms this rate 
is 0.55 and 0.56 for constrained and unconstrained firms (Table 9). This shows 
that downward adjustment rate is higher than upward adjustment rate even after 
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controlling for financial constraints. Thus based on Altman's Z score measure of 
financial constraints both GMM1 and GMM2 deliver estimates that are consistent 
with our third hypothesis. Similarly Table 8 (GMM1) shows that for the measure 
SA1 (Panel B) and above target firms adjustment rates are 0.74 and 0.79 for 
constrained and unconstrained firms respectively. This speed for below target firms 
is 0.66 and 0.69 for constrained and unconstrained firms respectively.  Moreover 
according to Table 9 for SA1 measure, above target firms report adjustment rates 
of 0.75 and 0.83 for constrained and unconstrained firms respectively. The same 
measure for below target firms (Table 9) reports adjustment rate of 0.48 and 0.57 
for constrained and unconstrained firms respectively. Thus based on SA1 measure 
of financial constraints we have considerable evidence that higher firm total assets 
to book value of total assets. CFLOW is cash flow calculated by subtracting interest 
payments, dividend and taxes from EBIT. 
CONCLUSION
This study tries to empirically examine downward and upward adjustment behaviour 
of corporate cash holdings in Chinese firms. For this purpose we followed research 
studies in capital structure literature to first find out the above and below target 
cash holdings (Hovakimian et al., 2001; Drobetz & Wanzenried, 2006). In order 
to estimate adjustment rate this study utilises Arellano and Bond (GMM2) and 
Blundell and Bond (GMM1) dynamic panel data models. Findings indicate that 
downward adjustment rate is higher than upward adjustment rate. Both GMM 
models give robust results. We estimate upward and downward adjustment rate by 
incorporating financial constraints into the model. There is considerable evidence 
that downward adjustment rate is higher even after controlling for financial 
constraints. This may be due the fact that when a firm cash level is above its 
optimal level, it can distribute dividends, make repayments on loans etc., to bring 
the cash level down to the optimal level. On the other hand if a firm cash level 
is below optimal level, it can slash its investment, reduce or stop payout or even 
raise external funds to attain the optimal cash level. Thus alternatives available 
for downward adjustment towards optimal cash level results in higher downward 
adjustment rate. The results could be explained by the fact that more adjustment 
costs are associated with upward adjustment than downward adjustment process. 
In other word, the adjustment costs play an important role while adjusting for an 
optimal cash level.
Moreover the study further investigates adjustment rate of corporate cash 
holdings across three financial constraints, i.e., Altman's Z score, SA1 and SA2. 
All the three measures of financial constraints give results that are consistent with 
Dynamics of Cash Holdings in Chinese Firms 
149
our hypothesis. We found considerable evidence that those firms speedily adjust 
corporate cash holdings when they are financially unconstrained. This is in line 
with Almeida et al. (2004) that firms with higher investment needs and inhabiting 
in a highly imperfect market tend to hoard more cash to efficiently manage their 
liquidity because there investment ability is constrained by market frictions. 
They reported that cash holdings are affected by financial constraints such that 
financially constrained firms are more sensitive to cash flow volatility pattern than 
unconstrained firms.
The conclusion derived for the study is subject to some limitation and 
owing to these limitations the study can be extrapolated across various dimensions. 
The samples can be divided into pre and post crises era (crises-2008). For example 
during financial crises liquidity many companies evaporated and thus it will have 
an important implication for industries as a whole during crises. Furthermore 
Chinese stock market provides a unique setting for these studies due to the State 
owned and non-state owned enterprises. By dividing the sample into subsample of 
SOEs and NSOEs this study can further extrapolated to incorporate the sectorial 
level consideration especially with respect to the financing alternatives available 
to Chinese SOEs and NSOEs? Furthermore as per the findings of Jiang, Rapach, 
Strauss, Tu and Zhou (2007), China specific indicators like banks' loan expansion 
rate can be included as an interactive term because of the peculiar characteristics 
of Chinese stock market.
Industry business cycle can also be incorporated (Wu & Shamsuddin, 
2012) Apart from Industry another important consideration would be firm size. 
It will add more pragmatism to incorporate size effects by categorizing firms into 
small and large cap portfolios of industries (Hou & Moskowitz, 2005; Hou, 2007).
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